

YOU just
call just
everyone
you
don't
like a
FASCIST

Contents

- Introduction 3**
 - Acknowledgments 5
- A Very Basic History of Fascism 7**
 - Fascist Ideology 8
 - Fascist Organization 9
 - Fascist Regime. 10
 - Fascism After the War 10
- The History of Defining Fascism. 13**
 - The Fascist Era: 1919-1945 14
 - Against Definition: 1968-1991 21
 - The Fascist Ideal Type: 1991-2004. 23
 - The Deeds of Fascism: 2004-2007. 25
 - Fascist Networks: 2007-Present 26
- The Elements of a Definition of Fascism. 29**
 - Breadth 29
 - Precision 30
 - Typology 31
 - Usefulness 31
- Objectivity Is Anti-Fascist. 35**
 - Fascists Are Notorious Liars 35
 - Three Examples of Fascist Lies. 36
 - Fascism Is Destined for Failure. 40
 - Fascism Is Internally Contradictory 41
 - The Big Picture 44
- References 47**

Introduction

This zine was born of a fairly persistent question I got from my first zine, *You Can't Punch Every Nazi*: How do you define fascism? I do not promise to answer that question. In fact, doing so wouldn't be particularly useful. Definitions of fascism have come and gone, and adding one more definition in the form of a zine probably won't settle the question of what fascism is. What I want to do here is help you, the reader, arrive at your own definition of fascism. In other words, I don't want to tell you how to think about fascism; I want to tell you how to think about thinking about how to think about fascism.

In my experience, everyone seems to have their own definition of fascism, irrespective of their knowledge of the phenomenon. When most people ask me what my definition of fascism is, it seems to be only to tell me that either I agree with them or I am wrong. I don't pretend to have the ultimately correct definition of fascism (I barely have one), but I do have the research background to say I'm pretty confident in my outlook on fascism and defining it.

Before we begin, we must clarify some terminology that will be useful for us throughout this zine. I will use "fascism" with a lowercase F to denote all movements, past and present, that embrace fascist ideology. When I use "Fascism" with a capital F, I am referring specifically to Mussolini's National Fascist Party and the state which that party controlled. I will say "classical fascism" to refer to all fascisms prior to the end of World War II, and I will use "neo-fascism" to describe all the fascisms that came after. Note also that I refer to "fascisms" here because fascism, like all ideologies, has its nuances and factions.

The attempt to define fascism is not new. Attempts to define fascism have existed for as long as the fascist phenomenon itself existed. All of these methods have their advantages and disadvantages; none is authoritative or accepted consensus. However, if we look at attempts to define fascism over time, we see waves of approaches to defining fascism. Though the definitions scholars came up with differed, within their historical context, these scholars embraced similar approaches to how to define fascism.

It must be stressed that acceptable definitions at a given time needed to conform to the conventions for defining fascism of that same time. What constituted an acceptable definition of fascism was defined by overriding criteria for an acceptable definition. This is as restrictive as it is enabling. This might be thought of in terms of Kuhnian "paradigm shifts." Like degenerated sciences, older ways of defining fascism persist. While it might be comforting to believe that paradigm shifts

are progressive in nature, we can never be sure.

This zine is divided into three major sections with all but the last one having several subsections. The first section reviews the history of attempts to define (or refuse to define) fascism. I periodize the history of defining fascism into six unequal parts since the founding of the Fascist party in 1919. These six periods represent what I identify as major shifts in the way scholars approached defining fascism.

It is important to distinguish here “the way scholars defined fascism” from “the way scholars approached defining fascism.” Within a given paradigm, the former may vary among scholars while the latter would be the same. For instance, the first post-war¹ attempts to understand fascism on its own terms crafted lists of attributes. The attributes may have differed from scholar to scholar, but the idea that a list of attributes is sufficient for a definition of fascism was consistent between these scholars.

The second section considers some essential characteristics of approaches to defining fascism, allowing the reader to consider the literature and decide upon their own definition. This section is admittedly utilitarian in its approach. The framework I develop considers the process of tailoring a definition to an ever-changing fascist ideological milieu. I then assess the importance of a definition having predictive power in identifying fascist movements, individuals, and institutions in their infancy.

The final section is a manifesto and a plea for reasonableness where axiomatic rationality reigns. Fascism isn't only wrong because of the holocaust. It's wrong because it fails to deliver on its own promises as a matter of course. Fascism embraces pseudoscience and conspiracy theory to advance a Manichean view of the world. In opposition to how social animals such as humans have survived and thrived, fascists argue for a universal competition in every field of life aimed at total domination. This is not only morally reprehensible, it's socially unacceptable and evolutionarily unsustainable. “The fascist creep” is not something they do; it's something they are.

In all, I hope this serves as a useful field guide to the scholarly attempts to define fascism. As anti-fascists, it is our responsibility to be informed about what fascism is and how it is changing, so we can vigilantly fight it. In explaining what fascism is, I hope to express why fascism is bad and worth fighting.

¹ Throughout this zine, “post-war” refers to the period following the Second World War.

For me, this is not a moral decision based on sentimental longings for a multicultural society. This is about the survival of humanity. This is about a political structure that subsists on campaigns to eliminate segments of the population. This is about a society crafted for and by demagogic elites on the backs of everyone else. This is a fight for the future we want to live in.

You Just Call Everyone You Don't Like a Fascist remains, like all catalogued knowledge, a work in progress. Please feel free to send me edits, comments, or questions to the email address on the back page of this zine.

Acknowledgments

I'd like to thank first and foremost Rod Green who let me research fascist economic systems in his history of economic thought class. Thank you for letting me choose a topic outside of the bounds of both neoclassical and Marxian economics. I'd also like to thank Spencer Sunshine who is constantly teaching me about the weird and wacky world of neo-fascism. Thanks for agreeing to be on my dissertation committee. Thanks are also due to the rest of my dissertation committee, Clara Mattei, Claire Potter, and Paulo dos Santos. Thanks also to Eli Zaretsky for giving me a second chance at my historical studies qualifying exam.

Thanks to Daryle Lamont Jenkins who helped me with both my scholarship and my activism. Thanks to Alexander Reid Ross, Mark Bray, and George Ciccariello-Maher for supporting me through the far right harassment campaign when I lost my teaching job at John Jay College for being anti-fascist and anti-cop. Thanks are due to the various institutions that let me teach for them including John Jay College, New York University's Global Liberal Studies program, Long Island University–Brooklyn, and Howard University. Thanks to Geert Dhondt for attempting to get me a Political Economy of Fascism course at John Jay College (the enrollment was too low) and to Frank Collierius for getting me a Political Economy of Fascism minicourse at the New York Public Library.

Thanks to Gretchen Mullen, Spencer Sunshine, Craig Fowlie, Edward Burns, Marisela Beatriz Vanegas Alas, and Alexander Reid Ross for editing this zine before publication.

Thanks of course goes out to my mother for always believing in me and my brother for not believing in me and my father for staying silent on the matter. I apologize for writing this when I should be finishing my dissertation.

A Very Basic History of Fascism

Fascism capitalized on a particular moment in world history. The First World War demonstrated the apex of what conservative revolutionary writer Ernst Jünger called “total mobilization” in a 1930 essay of the same name. Huge industrial endeavors were marshaled together by warring states to test their behemoth machinery on the fields of battle.

The war, and particularly Italy and Germany’s loss of it, demonstrated forcefully that (in global capitalism) the destiny of the individual is subordinated to the destiny of the state. Following the ravages in the trenches, the Versailles Treaty heaped war debts on the losing states and mandated liberal social reforms.

In the realm of science, physics was moving in the direction of quantum mechanics; radiation was just coming to be understood; and the cellular aspects of reproduction were developing. These breakthroughs in science created an enthusiasm for applying scientific approaches in the social realm. Eugenics was gaining popularity among the masses.² (Its popularity among scientists was another matter.) Scientific management at the firm level and corporatism at the government level were gaining traction.³ In the arts, modernism had taken hold and spurred a variety of movements including Dadaism, Surrealism, and Futurism.

The world was rapidly changing. The country side was urbanizing and industrializing. Monarchies implemented elected legislatures and voter franchise expanded. Radical unions began agitating for political power through the strike and the ballot and had succeeded in staging

2 The theory that race and intelligence are co-determined genetically and that the human gene pool ought to be culled along racial lines to ensure a more intelligent population. For a good history of eugenics, check out Kevles, *In the Name of Eugenics*.

3 Scientific management refers to a system of business management developed by Frederick Taylor. Taylor advocates that, rather than a single boss overseeing a mass of workers, businesses should be organized into management hierarchies, similar to the middle management structure we see today. Corporatism is an alternative legislative structure in which industrial associations and (compulsory, state-run) unions are organized into representative government bodies called corporations which negotiate terms of employment that benefit the state/society. Corporatism has its origins in Roman Catholic advocacy for a third way between capitalism and communism. In most dictatorships, the chambers in which these corporations operated were consultative rather than legislative.

revolutions in Russia and several Eastern European countries.

Fascism was a reaction simultaneously against and in favor of all of these changes. It lauded the age of the total industrial mobilization by the state but championed the landed farmer. It praised the age of social engineering but steeped itself in religious myth. It repudiated legislatures and elections as weakening the state but sought its power by them.

The fascist message seemed to be in constant flux. Many of their positions, by the standards of liberal state policy, were contradictory. What was clear, however, was that the fascists were set on dismantling the state to rebuild it with themselves as the new elite for a new age.

Given this completely new political formation—one that prized the ascent to power more than what one was to do with that power—commentators struggled to make sense of it.

Fascist Ideology

The debate over fascist ideology is in the first instance a debate over whether such an ideology exists at all. There's certainly a compelling case to be made saying that it doesn't. As Robert Paxton notes in *The Anatomy of Fascism* the positions that fascists professed changed as they needed to appeal to new constituencies and form new political alliances.

Paxton argues that their professed ideology actually shifts in particular ways as fascist movements ascend to power. He says that fascists begin with a revolutionary anti-establishment sounding rhetoric, borrowing terminology and critiques of radical left-wing movements. As fascist organizations grow, Paxton argues, they find themselves needing to ally with conservative and liberal elements against communists in order to ascend to power. As such, fascist rhetoric becomes toned down and radicals within a given organization either change their tune or leave the organization.

Others argue that fascists do have an ideology that completely differs from the ideologies that predominated at the time of fascism's germination. In *The Birth of Fascist Ideology*, Zeev Sternhell writes that fascist ideology did exist and emerged from a synthesis of the anti-Marxist revolutionary left and the authoritarian conservative right. He locates fascist ideology originating not from Italy, but from France with groups like Action Française.

Alexander Reid Ross argues in *Against the Fascist Creep* that fascist ideology emerged from nihilistic egoism embodied by the likes of Max

Stirner and Friedrich Nietzsche. Ross argues that fascists took egoism and nihilism to justify a will to power—the drive to attain power for its/ one’s own sake.

Still others argue that fascism did not possess an ideology so much as an anti-ideology. Juan Linz, in an edited volume by Stein Larson et al. called *Who Were the Fascists?*, argues that fascists didn’t possess an ideology so much as occupy untapped “political space.” Ernst Nolte similarly identifies fascism with a series of negations (anti-liberal, anti-Marxist, anti-conservative), while also arguing fascism is marked by the leadership principle, the aim of totalitarianism, and the existence of a party army.

Fascist Organization

The party army was actually the conjuncture of two elements classical fascisms typically possessed: a political party and a paramilitary organization. This formation was not particularly new or unique to fascism. Radical leftists had been organizing both parties and paramilitary organizations for decades before fascism emerged. However, the way that fascists used these tools differed greatly from the radical left.

Whereas left paramilitary organizations were primarily defensive, used against strikebreaking and other forms of state and corporate repression, fascist paramilitary organizations were as much on the attack as they were on the defensive. Certainly these organizations protected fascist meetings from being disrupted by their opponents, but they came to be used as a hit squad to target political opponents. For example, the Italian Fascist paramilitary organizations, known collectively as the *squadristi*, were notorious for tying their political opponents to a chair and force-feeding them castor oil. They destroyed socialist institutions including newspapers, soup kitchens, and employment offices.⁴ Other fascist groupings had a similar record.

Classical fascist paramilitary organizations were ultimately extensions of the political party, although they were nominally separate. Their paths to power, however, crucially relied on paramilitary organizations to decimate their opponents through physical confrontation and property destruction. Classical fascist parties existed all across Europe and in some countries outside of Europe as well such as the RSS in India and Lehi in the land of Palestine. Stanley Payne has a list of many of the fascist parties of the classical fascist era in his book *Fascism: Comparison and Definition*.⁵

4 Paxton, *The Anatomy of Fascism*, 61.

5 Payne, *Fascism: Comparison and Definition*, 16-17.

Fascist Regime

Although dictatorships abounded in the classical fascist era, debate rages as to which can be considered properly fascist. Aspects of this debate are reflected in an excellent volume edited by Aristotle Kallis and António Costa Pinto called *Rethinking Fascism and Dictatorship in Europe*.

There were a variety of ways fascists ascended to state power, but the common thread that runs between them is that executive power was achieved extra-electorally. Mussolini was appointed prime minister by King Victor Emmanuel III following the Fascist March on Rome in which thousands of black-shirted Fascist Squadristi marched to the capitol ostensibly to take it over. Hitler, too, was appointed to the executive position of Chancellor by a desperate conservative establishment. In Romania and Austria, fascists entered into power-sharing agreements with non-fascist dictators.

Their regimes were marked with repression of all opposition parties (including other fascist parties), strict censorship of all media, repression of labor associations, and imprisonment and murder of political opponents. These regimes were also marked by a chipping away at representative democracy by executive decree and emergency orders.

Fascists reorganized the state to operate through supreme executive rule with all other organs of the state taking a consultative or subordinate role. The fascist state was to exist for its own sake, since fascists believe that the destiny of individuals is dependent on the destiny of the state.

Fascism After the War

It's common for commentators to say that following the Second World War, fascism was thoroughly discredited, but this isn't quite right. As fascists themselves correctly point out, none of the fundamental presuppositions of fascism were identified much less critically analyzed. As we will see in the next section, early commentators on fascism rarely distinguished it from other sorts of governance structures that caught their ire. It would be a couple decades before fascism came to be studied as a phenomenon of its own, and even then, such study was rarely conducted for the stated purpose of discrediting fascism.

It would be more accurate to say fascism was thoroughly unpopular and socially sanctioned following the Second World War. During the war, Allied states conducted fierce propaganda campaigns to paint

fascism not only as a foreign enemy, but also a domestic one. These campaigns were followed through with state repression of fascists. This repression was minimal in comparison to the repression of communists, but it was no less serious.

In Axis states, as state repression of the masses became ever more palpable, public enthusiasm for fascism began to wane, especially following the beginning of the Second World War. By the end of the war, Fascism was so unpopular in Italy, that it sparked a civil war, and when the dictator, Benito Mussolini, was killed by communist partisans, his body was strung up by the feet from a gas station roof in Milan for the public to beat to a bloody pulp.

In most of Europe, public displays of fascism were outlawed, as well as various forms of identity-based hatred. When fascists did manage to hold public gatherings, they were often broken up by groups of anti-fascists. Following the war, it was unpopular to be a fascist, and fascists knew it.

This was one of the reasons they decided to change their image. The other reason was a political necessity that all sides of the political spectrum felt. Parties and paramilitaries simply were not the vehicle of political and economic change that they were in the earlier part of the 20th century. Rather, lobbying groups, civil rights organizations, and think tanks came to the fore. Fascists redrew their ideology to fit the era of business suits and multiculturalism.

These changes have frustrated attempts to usefully define fascism in a way that encompasses both classical fascism and neo-fascism while excluding non-fascist ideologies, people, movements, and organizations. Some scholars have argued that such an attempt should not be made, that fascism belongs to the era before the end of the Second World War, and that anything succeeding that should go by a different name. Others, of course, have sought to define fascism in a way that encompasses its entire ideological canon in all of its diversity. We will discuss this debate and its implications over the course of this zine.

The History of Defining Fascism

It probably wouldn't surprise a reader to learn that the definition of fascism is highly contested in the academic (and non-academic) literature on the subject. Some have even argued that the entire project of defining fascism should be abandoned altogether. Certainly, most definitions of fascism reflect the opposite of the definer's personal politics. This includes my own.

At this point, however, we are not interested in determining which definition of fascism is the correct one. Rather we begin our investigation of what fascism is by studying what others had to say about fascism. We do this because it makes little sense to define fascism without consulting those who actually professionally study the phenomenon.

To make things easier to digest, I have broken the history of the history of fascism (also known as the *historiography* of fascism) into six time periods. These roughly reflect eras of new criteria for defining fascism. These eras are not in actuality as discrete as I have made them here. They overlap heavily, and it should be born in mind that older traditions still have currency in the present.

Our study begins with classical fascism's contemporaries. Those defining fascism at the time did not have the benefit of internal archives of fascist parties and governments. Rather, these writers had only an external view of fascism. Some feared it might be the way of the future while others treated it as a temporary formation of the same old thing.

The next phase in defining fascism came in the two decades following World War II. This phase began with a focus on authoritarianism and totalitarianism and ended with the fascist minimum: a list of requisite features an individual, party, movement, or state must exhibit to be considered fascist. It was then that fascist studies began to mature as a discipline.

The next era saw a sort of fatalism with the very idea of defining fascism. Scholars began to argue that the widespread pejorative use of "fascism" reduced the very concept of fascism to a term of abuse and could not be separated from any academic definition. Hence, they argued that defining fascism was a futile endeavor.

The following era was marked by pithy attempts to reduce fascism to a bare essence. Although they described the same phenomenon, the definitions were as different as they were similar. Scholars were partic-

ularly attuned to fascism as an ideological form alone. However, what constituted “essential” features of fascist ideology was and is highly contested.

The next phase in the development of fascism’s definition saw an attempt to abandon considering fascism ideologically altogether. These definitions sought to define fascism by what fascism *did*. These definitions attempted to be based on the actions of fascisms that matured into a party with state power. However, which of these fascisms qualified as fascism remained contested.

The latest era of the development of a definition of fascism saw fascism defined by its social and intellectual networks. These definitions sought to draw a straight line from movements they studied and the original fascist movement. This manner of defining fascism risks a bit of “guilt by association.” However, it’s good for identifying those who attempt to mask their fascist sympathies.

By the end of this section, you will hopefully have a solid understanding of the history of defining fascism. This will set us up for the following section, where we discuss the elements by which fascism is defined. These criteria will help us to avoid pitfalls when coming up with our own definitions. It will also help us to understand the historical context in which these definitional conventions emerged. This will hopefully assist us in identifying the fascisms of our day.

There are also some fairly good readers out there that showcase the literature on fascism. Among them, Walter Lacqueur’s *Fascism: A Reader’s Guide* and Aristotle Kallis’s *The Fascism Reader* do an excellent job of summarizing the literature up to the point that they were published. Kallis is especially useful because it has a historiography as its introduction. Much of this section is based on his work.

The Fascist Era: 1919-1945

As fascism grew, its commentators struggled to make sense of it. Not having the benefit of archives of internal party documents, personal letters, and publications, commentators had to make do with interpreting classical fascism’s external trappings. This was especially difficult since, as previously noted, fascist ideology was in constant flux.

Fascism As a Tool of Capitalists

Most communists saw the rise of classical fascism as coordinated by the bourgeoisie itself with only the nominal cover of being an independent movement. Antonio Gramsci’s analysis posited that the inherent contradictions of universal civic participation on the one

hand and the market's need for a disciplined workforce on the other led the bourgeoisie to employ fascism as a means of eliminating the former to preserve the latter while being able to wash their hands of the contravention of democratic freedoms.⁶ Karl Polanyi, himself not a communist, made a related argument in 1944 that fascism was the resolution of the incompatibility of capital markets and civic freedoms, though he did not go so far as to claim that its rise was orchestrated by the agents of capital.⁷

Leon Trotsky held a similar position to Gramsci, arguing, "The historic function of fascism is to smash the working class, destroy its organizations, and stifle political liberties when the capitalists find themselves unable to govern and dominate with the help of democratic machinery."⁸

Georgi Dimitrov, speaking to the 7th Congress of the Communist International, defined fascism as "the open, terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinistic, and most imperialist elements of finance capital."⁹

The degree to which communists contemporary to classical fascism saw it as an agent of the bourgeoisie verged on conspiracy theory, but the claim was not entirely baseless. Financial technocrats very much saw classical fascism as a means of enacting austerity policies in a period of heightened labor unrest.¹⁰ While fascism's communist contemporaries did explain that the bourgeoisie's reliance on an auxiliary political force was motivated by a consideration of the optics of state repression of newly won civil liberties, what they failed to explain was how such a movement was able to fill its ranks.

Clara Zetkin took a different tack. A German communist, Zetkin called Fascism "the concentrated expression of the general offensive undertaken by the world bourgeoisie against the proletariat,"¹¹ her approach to classical fascism was more nuanced than the approaches discussed so far. For Zetkin, classical fascism was the result of the failure of communist revolution and the subsequent disenchantment of the proletariat with socialist politics. Thus, the proletariat join the ranks of fascists who present themselves as the only alternative for workers.

6 Gramsci, "Democracy and Fascism."

7 Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*.

8 Trotsky, "Whither France?"

9 Dimitrov, "The Fascist Offensive and the Tasks of the Communist International", 126.

10 Mattei, "Austerity and Repressive Politics."

11 Zetkin, "Fascism."

According to Zetkin, the bourgeoisie, wary of socialism, puts all of its support behind fascism. Unlike her peers, Zetkin saw bourgeois participation in classical fascism as a latent phenomenon.

What these theorists have in common is their treatment of classical fascism as a minor part of an otherwise clearly delineated class war endemic of capitalism and its fundamental incompatibility with democratic rule. The existence of classical fascism threw into disarray the communist prediction of an inevitable proletarian revolution against a diametrically opposed bourgeoisie. The existence of a cross-class movement opposed to communism and its aspirations presented a problem for Marxist class analysis if the classical fascists were not in some manner connected to the bourgeoisie.

Fascism as the Breakdown of the Enlightenment

Marxists embracing Freudian psychoanalysis sought to apply their theories of cognition and sexuality to explain the motivation for joining classical fascist ranks on the one hand and the general apprehension toward interfering with classical fascist methods on the other. Wilhelm Reich, writing in 1933, located the appeal of classical fascism in a generalized repression of sexuality which classical fascism sublimated into aestheticized violence.¹² Similarly, writing five years after World War II, Theodor Adorno argued that classical fascism was the result of the proliferation of the authoritarian personality, the origin of which he located in punitive parenting practices and repressed homosexuality.¹³ While these theories presented a compelling, if controversial, case for the underlying sexual motivations behind the enthusiasm that met rising fascism, the lack of historical specificity leaves them wanting.

Horkheimer and Adorno in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* written during the Second World War and revised after chalk up the rise of classical fascism to the self-destructive nature of Enlightenment thought and the inherent tension between social and cognitive freedom. Namely, the pair write, "If consideration of the destructive aspect of progress [under enlightenment thought] is left to its enemies, blindly pragmatized thought loses its transcending quality and, its relation to truth."¹⁴

Similarly, Erich Fromm chalks up the rise of classical fascism as a manifestation of the general human unpreparedness for freedom

12 Reich, *The Mass Psychology of Fascism*. See also his shorter pamphlet *What Is Class Consciousness?*

13 Adorno, et al., *The Authoritarian Personality*.

14 Horkheimer and Adorno, *The Dialectic of the Enlightenment*, xiii.

in his 1941 *The Fear of Freedom*.¹⁵ In fact, Fromm goes so far as to posit freedom as a psychological problem in the book's first chapter. Throughout the book, Fromm offers a historical account of the slow development of individual freedom from the age of absolutism. In tracing freedom's historical development, he also traces the development of personality types emergent to deal with the proliferation of new individual freedoms. In particular, he develops two types: the authoritarian who uses their freedom irrespective of others, and the automaton who seeks to escape the dizzying abundance of choice by simply conforming. Together, these personality types form the dialectic psychology of Nazism in which authoritarians capture the conformity of obedient followers.

Writing two years after the war, Max Horkheimer draws similar attention to the crisis of the individual. Horkheimer argues that the decline of absolutism gave way to reason as a humanistic enterprise during the Enlightenment. Whereas reason as conceived by the Enlightenment would be focused on the ends (that is, pursuit of universal truth or what Horkheimer calls "objective reason"), the demands of a democratic polity force the individual to appeal to a reason that justifies the existence of the individual in the world (this type of reasoning, which he calls "subjective reason", he argues focuses on the means). This ideological move from the uncertainty of objective truth to the self-assuredness of subjective reason eventually crystallizes into a dogmatic enterprise where the veracity of facts are subordinated to their usefulness in justifying the subject's perspective (what he calls "instrumental reason") which provides the fertilizer for fascist ideology.¹⁶

Such an analytical framework was implied a year prior in Jean-Paul Sartre's *Anti-Semite and Jew* (published in French as *Reflections on the Jewish Question*) where he describes what Horkheimer calls "instrumental reason" as arguments in "bad faith" in which he emphasizes the aspect of faith in an epistemological framework into which facts and speculation are haphazardly crammed.¹⁷ Sartre explains that such frameworks are allowed to proliferate because of the nature of Enlightenment reason,

accustomed as we have been since the Revolution to look at every object in an analytic spirit, that is to say, as a composite whose elements can be separated, we look upon persons and characters as mosaics in which each stone coexists with the others without that coexistence affecting the nature of the whole. Thus anti-Semitic opinion appears to us to be a

15 Fromm, *The Fear of Freedom*.

16 Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason*.

17 Sartre, *Anti-Semite and Jew*.

molecule that can enter into combination with other molecules of any origin whatsoever without undergoing any alteration.¹⁸

What these theorists have in common is a view of classical fascism being a result of the incompatibility of human psychology, or more generally the human condition, with the basic tenets of Enlightenment rationality. While this is a compelling explanation for how the public might come to a point at which reason and freedom are instrumentalized against themselves, what their explanation lacked was an explanation for why the phenomenon took hold en masse across Europe in the first half of the 20th century.

While these early assessments of classical fascism tackled the catalyst for fascism, all treated it as an instrumental consequence of an underlying cause rather than a self-contained movement which possessed an ideology. The novelty of classical fascism, its rapid ascent, its fluctuating policy commitments, and its brutality appalled its contemporary opponents who regarded it as a mass psychosis seized upon by opportunistic irrational demagogues. Compounding this confusion were its contemporary ideological fellow travelers who critiqued the classical fascist phenomenon from its political right. In rebuking certain aspects of classical fascist practice on its own terms, these commentators integrated themselves into a self-referential fascist canon developing in real time.

The Fascist Minimum: 1945-1968

The fall of the fascist states in 1945 ushered in an economic boom for the Global North and a wave of decolonization in the Global South. For the capitalist West and the Communist East, there was a refocusing towards the cold war. In the capitalist West, this was experienced as repression of more and more of the left, particularly in academia and the arts. This, above much else, charted the direction fascist studies would go.

The post-war commentators on fascism had the benefit of hindsight and archival resources to draw upon. Although fascism was not dead¹⁹ the end of its regimes marked a caesura in fascist history that gave historians a discrete endpoint of their investigation. Finding a common starting point was a different story.

18 Ibid., 8.

19 Some good resources on the post-war fascist international include Coogan, *Dreamer of the Day*; Lee, *The Beast Reawakens*; and Del Boca and Giovana, *Fascism Today*.

In the communist East, Dimitrov's formulation of what fascism was became official state policy and communist parties around the world followed suit integrating it into their party lines. Because of this, the rest of this study will focus on how fascism changed definitions in the West.

The cold war induced some pretty hefty elisions in the West of fascism and communism. The most popular of these is without a doubt Hannah Arendt's opus on Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia called *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. In it she claims the pair of regimes are of a feather in their totalitarian nature.²⁰ Arendt thought that totalitarian regimes aim to turn classes into undifferentiated masses at the behest of the state. Totalitarianism aimed to erase the private sphere. This framework would inform much of the study on fascism in the '50s.

Another major work in the direction of fascist studies was George Mosse's *The Crisis of German Ideology*. Mosse argued that Nazism was the result of the slow burn of romanticism replacing absolutism. Mosse describes the Nazis as fulfilling certain longings left open by the demise of absolutism. What's of note here is that Mosse differentiates Nazism as unique to Germany and certain unique historical conditions, rather than an ideology capable of winning power like any other.

On the opposite end of the spectrum is Eugen Weber whose *Varieties of Fascism* surveys the various fascist movements that cropped up in the classical fascist era. Weber distinguishes between national socialist and fascist in his book, but never really gives a good explanation as to the distinction.

However, the author who would come to define fascist studies for generations would be Ernst Nolte. His first book *Three Faces of Fascism* (published in German as *Fascism in Its Epoch*) would define fascism unsatisfactorily as "resistance to transcendence." This definition is interesting as it captures the tendency of fascism to grope desperately for the surety of modernity (or pre-modernity) even after having seen through to the subjective nature of human experience.

Nolte points to a monarchist French grouping called Action Française as the origin of what he sees as a fascist dialectic. Taking Action Française as the phenomenological thesis, Italian Fascism is its negation insofar as it oriented itself not to resurrecting a lost absolutism, but rather forging a new modernity. Nolte saw Nazism as a sublation of the two, combining the racial anti-Semitism of the former with the

20 For whatever reason, Italy is excluded from this typology despite Mussolini's Fascism having been the first to receive "totalitario" as an epithet.

alternative modernizing project of the latter.²¹

Nolte's book was arguably the first to explore classical fascism as a transnational ideology on its own terms.²² As such, it became a point of departure for the emerging fascist studies scholarship for decades to come. Its chauvinistic emphasis on ideas and great men (Maurras, Mussolini, and Hitler), however, which Sternhell blames on Nolte's phenomenological approach, subsequently came under fire from other scholars for ignoring the social and economic conditions which allowed classical fascism to grow.²³

It was however a definition in a follow-up work never published in English that gained traction among scholars. In it he provides a list of minimum features an individual, institution, party, movement, or state must exhibit to qualify as fascist. Stanley Payne translates them as:

1. Anti-Liberalism
2. Anti-Marxism
3. Anti-Conservatism
4. The Führerprinzip (The Leadership Principle)
5. A Party Army
6. Aim of Totalitarianism²⁴

The use of a list to describe fascism was novel and set the pace for defining fascism. Systems for such an approach came to vary wildly with some offering hard and fast criteria for the fascist label, others presenting a loose aggregation of features against which to measure any political tendency's proximity to fascism, and others still employing a point system for the same purpose.

This second wave of scholarship introduced the possibility of studying classical fascism as a self-contained ideology, although the lack of

21 This model is in the tradition of a Hegelian dialectic, which Nolte likely picked up from his mentor Martin Heidegger. A dialectic has three parts, an initial thesis, a negation of the thesis, and a sublation. Taking Action Française as the phenomenological thesis, Italian Fascism is its negation insofar as it oriented itself not to resurrecting a lost absolutism, but rather forging a new modernity, Nolte saw Nazism as a sublation of the two, combining the racial anti-Semitism of the former with the alternative modernizing project of the latter.

22 Sternhell, "Fascist Ideology."

23 See, for example, Kershaw, *The Nazi Dictatorship*.

24 *Die Krise des Liberalen Systems und Fascistischen Bewegungen (or the Crisis of the Liberal System and Fascist Movements)* as referenced in Payne, *Fascism: Comparison and Definition*.

a demarcation made even the choice of subject for scholars in the burgeoning fascist studies a subjective one. Thus, while the emergence of a fascist studies allowed for exploration of fascism as a political and ideological phenomenon, concern over its definition in light of its legacy transformed into a whetstone on which scholars could grind their axe of political and methodological animosity. The one thing that did seem agreed upon was regarding the end of the Second World War as a historiographical point of finality. In his germinal book, Nolte admitted the continued existence of fascist currents, but explicitly precluded them from his study of the “fascist era.”

The work of Nolte and his contemporaries shifted classical fascism from a case study to an object of study in itself. That is, prior to their intervention, classical fascism was largely an example scholars used to demonstrate the salience of their general philosophies about epistemology, human behavior, and political economy among other subjects. The shift to viewing classical fascism as a phenomenon unto itself allowed for a wealth of comparative and historical accounts to explain it not merely as a failure of, or aberration from, liberal capitalism but in terms of its own ascendance.

Against Definition: 1968-1991

In the late 60s and early 70s the world exploded with student protests in both the capitalist West and the Communist East. This was met by a repressive reaction on the part of world governments. As a result, governments globally began to shift to the right.

The general rightward lurch of politics in the Western world was reflected in fascist studies. With the blossoming of ever more lists of essential fascist features, fascist studies seemed like it was heading in the opposite direction of scholarly consensus. In this environment, scholars, particularly of a right-wing persuasion, began to deny the idea of a lowercase-F fascism altogether. Three scholars stand out in this camp, Italian historian Renzo de Felice, Canadian historian Gilbert Allardyce, and US political scientist and post-war eugenics enthusiast A. James Gregor.²⁵

In *Interpretations of Fascism*, de Felice argued that Italian Fascism was historically and geographically unique. In so doing, he makes two

25 A. James Gregor was the co-founder of both the International Association for the Advancement of Ethnology and Eugenics. This organization put Gregor well within the orbit of unrepentant wartime Fascist and world-renowned economist Corrado Gini and perhaps the single strongest link between mainstream conservatism and fascism in the US and the world Roger Pearson.

ideological moves. First, in asserting geographical specificity, de Felice forecloses on comparison between regimes, parties, and movements outside of the Italian case. Second, in asserting fascism's historical specificity, Felice presents Fascism as a historical aberration from an Italian nation that came to embrace democratic freedoms.

Gilbert Allardyce went quite a bit further with his critique. In "What Fascism is Not" Allardyce argues that fascism's variegated mode of deployment by scholars, its use as a pejorative, and its use by contemporary anti-fascists as an ideological political term rendered fascism as an analytical term tempestuous at best and impossible in all likelihood. Allardyce dismisses with the need to define fascism by categorically denying its existence as a generic concept and as an ideology. Allardyce ultimately argues that the Noltean decision to cut off analysis of fascism at the end of the Second World War should be a hard and fast rule. He regards fascism as a lesser evil to communism.

A. James Gregor goes farther than either de Felice or Allardyce. Gregor, like the other two, allows that we can acknowledge the existence of capital-F Fascism as a thing. However, lowercase-f fascism, Gregor argues, is not a thing, and if it is a thing, it is merely a developmental dictatorship like those in post-colonial Africa and Asia. For Gregor, Fascism was merely Italy's way of catching up with the more developed countries to its west.

This time period also saw an attempt to link fascism to socialism. Gregor—as noted by Sternhell et al. in *The Birth of Fascist Ideology*—claimed that Fascism was simply a species of Marxism. Sternhell himself rebuked this claim for the softer claim that fascism combined an anti-Marxist revision of socialism along the lines of Georges Sorel with the ideas of the traditionalist right.

Marxists took a different tack. With the death of Stalin and the opening of his archives, many Western Marxists became disenchanted with Marxist orthodoxy and sought alternative explanations to the official Comintern line. Martin Kitchen argues that fascism was a certain type of reaction to the crisis of capitalism and liberalism, similar to Gramsci, in the absence of a strong socialist movement.²⁶ Nicos Poulantzas also sees fascism as a response to this crisis, but classifies it as an authoritarian variant of capitalism.²⁷

26 Kitchen, *Fascism*. Other books in this new Marxist tradition include Neocleous, *Fascism*, Mason, *Nazism, Fascism and the Working Class*, and Woodley, *Fascism and Political Theory*.

27 Poulantzas, *Fascism and Dictatorship*.

This fatalism towards defining a generic fascism was designed to foreclose on fascist studies or at least to narrow it significantly. Perversely, this approach had the opposite effect. With scholars unconcerned with whether what they were studying constituted fascism, they were freer to draw comparisons and connections without worrying about tainting this or that movement with the stain of “fascism.” In addition to the numerous surveys of classical fascist movements and regimes,²⁸ there also emerged numerous surveys of movements and ideologies intersecting with the classical fascist phenomenon.²⁹

The Fascist Ideal Type: 1991-2004

The '90s saw the increasing digitization of experience and the progressive privatization of public services. Governments were beginning to shift to the left socially, but not economically. An academic literary canon was developing that its detractors and eventually its adherents called “post-modernism.” Richard Wolin has a compelling case for the ideological kinship of this post-modern canon and that of fascism’s origins.³⁰

By the '90s, fascist studies had become an increasing profusion of microhistories. The fatalism of the potential for a fruitful definition of fascism in the general sense that proliferated in the '70s and '80s gave way to studying regimes, movements, and ideologies related to Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany with little regard for their status as properly fascist themselves. This included not only the contemporaries of the classic regimes, but also their ideological predecessors and successors.

This wealth of case studies, replete with archival and ethnographic evidence, peered beyond the external trappings of the image fascist political milieux projected of themselves to their actual ideology and internal organization. Thus, scholars were increasingly able to induce common foundations between the world views of various fascist movements. The proliferation of feature-based definitions alongside the skepticism toward the relevance of such definitions pushed some

28 See e.g. Nagy-Talavera, *The Green Shirts and the Others* on the Romanian and Hungarian cases; Hayes, *Fascism*, Cassels, *Fascism*, Laqueur, *Fascism: A Reader's Guide*, and Carsten, *The Rise of Fascism* on classical fascism generally; and Mosse, *Toward the Final Solution* comparing German and other national socialisms.

29 See e.g. McClelland, *The French Right* and Sternhell, *Neither Right nor Left* on the French traditionalist right, Theweleit, *Male Fantasies* on the Freikorps, and Roberts, *The Syndicalist Tradition and Italian Fascism* on Italian syndicalism.

30 Wolin, *The Seduction of Unreason*.

scholars to explore classical fascism's apparent features and compare between regimes rather than trying to define the phenomenon as a whole.

In sloughing off Noltean definitions, fascist studies was able to start over in defining fascism, this time seeking parsimony rather than exhaustive completeness. This search for a fixed essence, or "ideal type," permitted, in various ways, the diversity in ascent to power and regime style that existed in the various dictatorships that swept across Europe. Further, these definitions could be profitably used to assess neo-fascism.

Perhaps the most well known of these is that of Roger Griffin. Although his full definition is quite longer, it has been reduced to "palingenetic ultranationalism."³¹ The word "palingenetic" simply connotes an obsession with rebirth. Thus for Griffin, as long as you are obsessively trying to revive a nation that you see as decadent, you qualify as fascist. Griffin's definition has probably the most use among scholars of fascism, likely in no small part due to Griffin's insistence that it is the consensus definition. It's not.

Roger Eatwell also has a parsimonious definition of fascism in his book *Fascism: A History*. He identifies two core beliefs of fascism that he refers to as its "affective-communal" side and its "economic-rational" side. The affective-communal side refers to its concern with national preservation above all else. The economic-rational side sought to create an economy that worked for the nation while preserving individualism in the market. He ultimately defines fascism as "a form of thought that preaches the need for social rebirth in order to forge a *holistic-national radical Third Way*."³²

One of the core aspects of fascist thought was its rejection of the conditions of modernity. Many scholars have therefore proposed that fascism simply sought to undo the Enlightenment. Ruth Ben-Ghiat, whose work focuses on the colonial and propaganda aspects of fascism, defines fascism as seeking to create an "alternative modernity" to effectively do over the transition from pre-modern feudalism to a new society.

Kevin Passmore wrote a very short and accessible survey of fascist ideology and practice called *Fascism: A Very Short Introduction*. This 5" x 7" book is only 156 pages and defines fascism as "...a set of ideologies and practices that seeks to place the nation, defined in exclusive

31 Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism*, 38.

32 Eatwell, *Fascism: A History*, 13.

biological, cultural, and/or historical terms, above all other sources of loyalty, and to create a mobilized national community."³³

Passmore argues that fascism is simultaneously reactionary and radical–reactionary because of its hostility to socialism and feminism but radical in that it seeks to create a new elite.

Though similar, no one definition has emerged as the consensus. Like with the Noltean list-form definitions, Griffinian ideal type definitions proliferated to a point where few cared about how fascism was defined, though scholars were not necessarily hostile to the idea of defining fascism as was the case with the fallout over Noltean definitions.

The Deeds of Fascism: 2004-2007

The early 2000's were marked by an apparent accord between the mainstream left and right following the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in the United States. This motivated an expansion of the surveillance state, and with it, a rightward lurch on the right to privacy.

This period of time was marked by an attempt to label fascism by what fascism did. David Renton, writing in the Marxist tradition, had taken a similar approach in his 1999 *Fascism: Theory and Practice*. However, it was Robert Paxton in his 2004 *The Anatomy of Fascism* who created a formula for this account of what fascists did.

Paxton identifies two shortcomings of fascist studies prior to his intervention and, like Renton, reserves harsh words for his predecessors in fascist studies. For one, the search for a static essence is in methodological contradiction with what Paxton sees as a political tendency whose movements shift their ideology by design. Secondly, research on classical fascism often isolates fascist phenomena from its political, social, and cultural context. Taken together, Paxton refers to this approach as constituting a "bestiary" of fascism—identifying its movement by distinguishing features against a modicum of incidental scenery.

Paxton proposes a five-stage model of the fascist ascent to power. His work primarily focuses on finding the commonality between the Fascist and Nazi process of organizing, networking, and eventual seizure and use of state power. The five stages he proposes are creation, rooting, getting power, exercising power, and either radical-

33 Passmore, *Fascism: A Very Short Introduction*, 31.

ization or entropy.

Some drawbacks to Paxton's approach are that he never clearly establishes why he focuses only on Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany to the exclusion of many fascist groupings that did not follow the two regimes' common path. Thus, his definition is in a way circular: regimes are deemed fascist if they follow this path to power because I have deemed fascist only those regimes who have followed this path to power. Further, he offers no explanation for bringing in examples from other movements that he is not able to define as fascist with his five-stage formulation.

Ultimately, Paxton is not faithful to his promise of defining fascism exclusively in terms of what fascists did. He resorts to defining fascists as having seven "mobilizing passions" which include: 1) the primacy of the group over the individual, 2) perceived group victimhood, 3) fear of corrosive decadence within the group, 4) integration of the group through conviction and violence, 5) enhanced sense of identity and belonging, 6) authority according to 'natural' leadership and hierarchy, and 7) the aestheticization of violence and will.³⁴

Defining fascism in terms of what it did ended up being a fruitless endeavor. Although Paxton's formulation survives in the literature, it ultimately relies on the modes of definition of his predecessors to justify the model he constructs.

Fascist Networks: 2007-Present

In late 2007, the financial market collapsed causing a wave of dissatisfaction with the global economic system. The austerity policies implemented following the crash only worsened this public ire. This presented an opportunity for fascists who spent the next eight years capitalizing on it, translating people's economic grievances into racist and xenophobic grievances.

In fascist studies, Griffin's insistence in a plethora of publications, forewords, and introductions that he had the consensus definition of fascism diminished others' attempts at crafting their own. Paxton's attempt to slough off definitions of fascism based on ideology created a new wave of scholarship that sought a non-ideological way to define fascism.

This came in the form of analyzing fascist social and intellectual networks. One of the first studies in this vein was an analysis of the

34 Paxton, *The Anatomy of Fascism*, 6-7.

post-war far right movement in Europe that came to be known as the European New Right by Tamir Bar-On called *Where Have All the Fascists Gone?* In it, Bar-On draws a clear line between the European New Right and classical fascists through their social and ideological networks. With this methodology, Bar-On is able to account for changes in ideology without tweaking a problematic list of features, ideal type, or path to ascending to power.

This approach had been pioneered by and is still the preferred method of journalists writing on fascism. One of the earliest such works was *Fascism Today: A World Survey* by Angelo Del Boca and Mario Giovana originally published as *Children of the Sun* in Italian. In it, the pair trace the network of bank accounts and safe houses for classical fascist war criminals. In addition to describing the Nazi rat lines as they came to be known, they also describe the influence hosting fascist fugitives from war crimes trials had on local populations and their politics.

Another journalistic survey of fascism and fascists comes from Kevin Coogan in his *Dreamer of the Day*, which surveys the life and connections of US expat fascist Francis Parker Yockey. Coogan not only traces Yockey's social connections but also the intellectual reverberations of his influence into the present day. An excellent journalistic survey of US neo-fascism comes from Leonard Zeskind's *Blood and Politics*, which traces US neo-fascism from the organizing efforts of Willis Carto to the book's publication in 2009.

Another work using a similar methodology comes from Stephen Shenfield's *Russian Fascism* where he details the connections between neo-fascist organizations in post-Soviet Russia. Unlike Del Boca and others in this camp, Shenfield is not able to draw direct social connections to the classical fascist era. He does, however, detail the close ideological connections between these Russian nationalist organizations and fascist ideology. To do this, Shenfield settles upon four separate definitions of fascism against which to measure each of the groups he surveys.

Federico Finchelstein proposes a "fascist matrix" of features and ideological commitments shared by fascists. However, his primary focus is the connections between classical Fascists and Argentine fascists and populists, especially Juan Perón and Jorge Rafael Videla. Among his many books, three stand out in this vein: *Transatlantic Fascism*, *The Ideological Origins of the Dirty War*, and *From Fascism to Populism in History*.

One of the most ambitious accounts of fascism as networks comes from Alexander Reid Ross in his *Against the Fascist Creep*. Despite

appealing to a synthesis of Griffin and Paxton's definitions, as well as coming up with his own ideal type definition,³⁵ he largely disregards these definitions when engaging in his exploration of fascism and especially neo-fascism. A geographer by trade, Ross demonstrates the social and intellectual connections between fascists across the US and Europe, tracing from the classical fascist era to the present day. Because of this approach, Ross is able to account for the various ways neo-fascism has morphed fascist ideology to be almost unrecognizable.

There are of course other notable works in this vein. *In the Shadow of Hitler* surveys Eastern European fascisms during the classical fascist era. The book is aimed at making an appeal to discuss Eastern European fascist regimes as fascist regimes in their own right rather than mere puppet governments of Nazi Germany. Another edited volume *Rethinking Fascism and Dictatorship in Europe* surveys various fascist and para-fascist³⁶ regimes in Europe during the fascist era.

35 "In short, fascism is a syncretic form of ultranationalist ideology developed through patriarchal mythopoesis, which seeks the destruction of the modern world and the spiritual palingenesis ("rebirth") of an organic community led by natural elites through the fusion of technological advancement and cultural tradition." Ross, *Against the Fascist Creep*, 7.

36 Para-fascist is a term coined by Roger Griffin to mean the various regimes that used many elements of fascist style of rule without committing ideologically to fascism.

The Elements of a Definition of Fascism

Now that we've surveyed various existing definitions (and anti-definitions) of fascism, we can begin to measure these definitions in terms of their accuracy in describing the fascist phenomenon. My goal here is not to fish through fascist history to determine the best definition or synthesis of definitions of fascism. Rather, I aim to lay out the parameters by which we can measure a definition of fascism.

I identify three elements that a definition of fascism should aim to satisfy: breadth, precision, and usefulness. Breadth is the degree to which a definition includes all fascist individuals, movements, ideologies, organizations, etc. Precision is the degree to which a definition excludes non-fascist individuals, movements, ideologies, organizations, etc. Usefulness will depend on the reason one seeks to define fascism.

I will describe each of these in terms of the strengths and shortcomings of some of the definitions we have reviewed. This will not include all of the definitions we have explored, but will touch on the three prominent definitions in the literature: Nolte's fascist minimum, Griffin's ideal type, Paxton's stages theory, and the new fascist networks theory. I will then describe how definitions of fascism inform anti-fascist organizing.

Breadth

Breadth is the degree to which a definition includes all of the entities one would consider fascist. A definition that isn't sufficiently broad will unnecessarily exclude movements that might otherwise qualify as fascist. A definition that's too broad, however, may include non-fascist entities or describe entities that could theoretically exist but not be fascist.

The Noltean definition of fascism has come under attack for being insufficiently broad. Sternhell³⁷ contends that this is a result of Nolte's Heideggerian method which sees things in terms of a dialectic of great ideas manifest in great men. Because of this, Nolte's definition is only broad enough to definitively include Charles Maurras of Action Française, Benito Mussolini, and Adolf Hitler.

Griffin's definition has been criticized for not being broad enough as well. Although Griffin's definition includes quite a few of the entities

37 Sternhell, "Fascist Ideology", 369-71 which also paraphrases Mosse, "Three Faces of Fascism by Ernst Nolte" discussed here.

one might consider fascist. However, his requirement that fascism be palingenetic presupposes a mass-mobilized plan for national rebirth. Because of this, Griffin's definition excludes Croatia and their Ustaša, one of the most brutal and anti-semitic fascist formations during the Second World War.

Paxton's five-stage model also excludes movements that might otherwise be considered fascist. Because Paxton focuses on the Fascist and Nazi ascents to power, he is unable to account for entities that either did not ascend to power or did so in alternative ways. Rebecca Ann Haynes has particularly taken Paxton to task for this as it pertains to Romania's Iron Guard and Hungary's Arrow Cross.³⁸

It is rare that the network approach is insufficiently broad. For the most part, those drawing connections between fascists as their criteria for analyzing them rarely stop short of analyzing genuine fascists. It is for this reason that I am partial to this definition.

Precision

In addition to being insufficiently broad, definitions of fascism can also be insufficiently precise. A precise definition of fascism excludes entities that would be considered non-fascist (but not necessarily anti-fascist). A definition that is insufficiently precise would fail to exclude non-fascist entities.

Nolte's definition, which applies to few entities can not be accused of being insufficiently precise. If the neo-fascist revisions of fascism have taught us anything, it's that none of the characteristics Nolte points out are essential to fascism.

Griffin's definition, in addition to not being broad enough, is also not precise enough. Although, as previously noted, Griffin's definition excludes what might be considered genuine fascist entities, it also includes non-fascist entities such as apartheid South Africa and Rhodesia as well as various states during the colonial era.

Paxton's definition is also in some ways insufficiently precise. Because Paxton insists that fascists be measured by what they do rather than their ideological commitments, Paxton's methodology can be applied to many non-fascist grassroots radical movements.

The network theory has its advantages but its precision is not usually among them. The difficulty in tracing social and intellectual affinities is determining what affinities are actually fascist in nature. As

38 Haynes, "Review of *The Anatomy of Fascism*."

Paxton notes, fascists made uneasy alliances with other factions for political expediency. Most wouldn't consider authoritarian conservatives, socialists, or liberals are fascists merely for assisting in the rise of fascism, detestable as it may be. Ultimately, the network theory requires some other auxiliary theory about demarcation between fascists and non-fascists.

Typology

Breadth and precision ultimately point to a definition that situates fascism within a spectrum of ideologies. In order to do so, one must compare fascism to other positions and establish the degree to which the fascist and the non-fascist are separate.

Stanley Payne does this most explicitly in *Fascism: Comparison and Definition*. Payne identifies fascism as the most extreme species of authoritarian nationalism of which the radical right and then the conservative right are less extreme.

For Payne, the demarcation is dependent upon the orientation to the present system. Someone in the conservative right camp merely wants to see the present government introduce authoritarian reforms. Someone on the radical right, however, believes such reforms are only possible by replacing political leaders while largely keeping the state's political system intact. Fascists, Payne says, seek to completely remodel the state in order to introduce authoritarian reforms.

Most definitions of fascism don't seek to place fascism within a typology. The Noltean, Griffinian, and Paxtonian definitions simply demarcate fascist from non-fascist, even if imperfectly. Network-type definitions, however, largely require a demarcation point to be artificially imposed if one exists at all. Thus network definitions do fit fascism within a broader political spectrum, but do not necessarily demarcate between political positions.

Usefulness

In my opinion, the most important criterion by which to judge a definition of fascism is the usefulness of the definition. As an anti-fascist, I am interested in definitions that can assist in identifying fascisms as they continue to evolve. There are, of course, other criteria for usefulness, for example for the sake of limiting a study on fascism.

The Noltean definition is useful only for identifying fascist entities that mimic the similarities between Action Française, the National Fascist Party, and the Nazi Party. Nolte himself said his book *Three*

Faces of Fascism was limited in its analysis to fascism before 1945. As far as usefulness in fighting neo-fascism, it is unlikely Nolte's definition would be particularly useful. Fascists have learned a lot since the Second World War and have adapted their style and propaganda accordingly.

Griffin's definition is, if not useful, very convenient. Griffin himself has documented neo-fascisms as well as classical fascisms, and so his definition reflects a cognizance for what fascism has become. If one is interested in limiting a study of fascism based on the Griffonian definition, good luck. Griffin's definition is sufficiently broad to include a wide variety of fascisms.

Although Paxton's formulation may be useful in investigating past movements to determine whether they *were* fascist, it doesn't hold much predictive power. Since the definition relies on a fascist ascent to power and the exercise of that power, by the time a fascism would be definitively identified by Paxton's definition, it would be too late to thwart its rise.

The network theory has several useful advantages for identifying fascist entities. First, it doesn't rely on fascists to reveal their sympathies which they often endeavor to keep hidden. Second, it doesn't rely on fascists to adopt a particular organizing style or ascent to power. The network theory asserts that fascists are defined by the company they keep.

Anti-Fascists and the Definition of Fascism

There is a mistaken notion that anti-fascists are interested in fighting *fascists*, whereas in actuality the aim of anti-fascists is to fight *fascism*. This means more than fighting fascists with a diversity of tactics, but also cutting off their support networks. Thus while anti-fascists aim at decimating fascism, anti-fascists cast their net of opposition wider than just fascists proper to confront their supporters with the choice they are making.

Although anti-fascists are not above physical confrontation, most anti-fascist action involves contacting employers, school administrators, parents, and venue owners, among others. There are a number of other activities anti-fascists engage in. Most of these activities, which I detail in "10 Anti-Fascist Activities That Don't Involve Your Fists" and Spencer Sunshine details in *40 Ways to Fight Nazis*, do not involve physical confrontation. For the most part, anti-fascist actions are limited to these non-physical means of intervening against fascism. Some anti-fascist groups even limit themselves to these forms of anti-fascist

action.

Anti-fascists use definitions of fascism to determine who it is they ultimately need to prevent from gaining social esteem for as long as those people remain fascists. Anti-fascists then analyze how these people whom they've determined are fascists³⁹ are supported socially.

Anti-fascists also have priorities and estimate the likelihood that a fascist can be swayed from fascism. Hence, more extreme measures may be reserved for public fascist groups, while a parental intervention may be sufficient for a budding teenage fascist.

If you start or join an anti-fascist organization, know that you bear a great responsibility to get your facts straight and your strategy right. Reach out to others for advice with secure communications. Always triple check your intel, and be careful for your own safety. I outline some safety tips in my previous zine *You Can't Punch Every Nazi*.

39 Usually by criteria outlined by authors referenced in this zine.

Objectivity Is Anti-Fascist

There is an unfortunate convention, particularly among journalists and researchers, of approaching fascism in a manner that is purportedly non-biased. This approach reserves fascism the benefit of the doubt and allows fascists to call into question well established fact without cause beyond their political vendetta. What this convention mistakes for objectivity is really ignorance and naïveté.

We would not call into question a physicist's objectivity for refusing to be agnostic on the theory of gravity in their investigation of general mechanics. We would not call into question a biologist's objectivity for refusing to be agnostic on the theory of evolution in their investigation of genetics. So too should we not call into question a journalist or researcher's objectivity when they refuse to be agnostic on all of the lies fascists tell in their investigation of fascism.

When we pretend that a priori ignorance constitutes objectivity, we yield to fascists the right to reignite long settled debates. Whether it's about race or history or intelligence or genetics, fascists have no problem resurrecting long dead points of conflict by deliberately ignoring the overwhelming literature that contradicts their claims. This shifts the scope of debate to "everyone against fascists." Although it should be reassuring that "everyone" is against fascists, what's not reassuring is that this frames fascists as constituting half of a debate rather than the extremely marginal quacks that they are.

If we are to be honest with the facts, then objectivity is anti-fascist. For starters, fascism is built on a thick web of reinforcing lies. Additionally, fascism has proved a historical failure and remains a theoretical failure. On top of all this, fascism is internally contradictory, possessing first principles that collapse on themselves when taken to their logical conclusion.

Fascists Are Notorious Liars

Fascism lays bare the process by which facts are produced. Its manner of argumentation starts not with analyzing facts, but by analyzing the people who posit them. Fascists seek to discredit ideas by calling into question their sources rather than their veracity, substituting skepticism for reason. And like with all skepticism, its aim is never universal. Fascists seek to discredit *certain* sources in order to bolster their otherwise debunked sources.

Fascists have built an ever-expanding canon of debunked sources that reinforces their world view. These sources intentionally disregard

countervailing evidence, which is denounced in various ways with conspiracy theories about academia and the media. Despite their preferred facts' obvious falsehood, it is often difficult to find sources to contradict fascist claims since the topics fascists often harp on are very obscure and much of the opposing literature is behind pay walls.

Fascists create a pipeline of self-indoctrination through the creation of intellectual rabbit holes. They are very particular about the terminology that they use, so attempts to search for their concepts land on their sources. Thus, fascists engage in a form of search engine optimization that predates search engines. Fascists have created institutions to produce fascist facts that operate largely separate from institutions that would contradict them so that their lies appear as fact. Hence, when dealing with fascists, it is best to be in the business of lie-checking rather than fact-checking.

Three Examples of Fascist Lies

Lie-checking means researching to determine if the theory, rather than its individual parts, is a lie. Although this is a less rigorous form of determining truth value, it is less time consuming and can often lead you to sources that have done the fact-checking job for you. To understand the importance of lie-checking, I'm going to fact-check three fascist lies to demonstrate the breadth of knowledge needed to fact-check their lies.

Human Biodiversity

One such lie is a form of racism going by the name of "human biodiversity." This fits well within their professed "eco-fascism." Human biodiversity purports to be based on biodiversity in environmental science. In environmental science, biodiversity is generally considered to be beneficial for a given environment and indicative of its growth.

The way neo-fascists tell it, this theory can be applied to groups of human races. This is their first error. Biodiversity applies to genes, species, symbiotic relationships, and ecosystems. The neo-fascists assert a long since debunked claim that race is genetic.⁴⁰ Even if we were to take their theory of genetic race, their theory of human biodiversity does not hold up to its second point: in order to preserve human biodiversity, races must be kept separate. Contrary to this belief, biodiversity maintains a genotype, species, symbiotic relationship, or ecosystem by encouraging a great deal of mixing. This is

40 See Barnshad, et al. "Deconstructing the Relationship Between Genetics and Race."

perhaps illustrated best by way of example.

In England, there is a species of moth known as the peppered moth that has two predominant phenotypes, one white with black spots, and one that is all black. Originally, the white moth prospered while the black moth was undiscovered. Then, during the industrial revolution, the black moths came to predominate. As air pollution was mitigated, the white moths once again predominated.

This is because these moths primarily landed on trees. Prior to the industrial revolution, trees provided camouflage to the white moths. During the industrial revolution, when pollution turned the trees black, the black moths were more easily able to blend in and avoid predators. When air pollution subsided, the white moths were once again selected for by the environment.

What would have happened if the phenotypes had been kept genetically or geographically separate? In the instance of geography, the white moths would have died off in the industrial revolution leaving those regions barren of moths, and the black ones would have died off during its clean-up, and there would be no moths left. In the instance of genetics, the white moths would have died off in the industrial revolution, and with no white genetic phenotype, would have died out with its clean-up. Thus, even if the genetic or species metaphor to race were scientifically valid, the neo-fascist theory of biodiversity doesn't hold up to how biodiversity actually works.

Eugenics

Eugenics is the belief that we can and should genetically select for intelligence on the basis of race. This assertion requires layers of lies in order to hold. Steven J. Gould does an excellent job debunking this web of lies in *The Mismeasure of Man*, and his book is the definitive source for the debunking of eugenics and related theories.

The way neo-fascists tell it, IQ is an inherently socially desirable and genetically inherited trait that should be selected for. IQ is presented by neo-fascists as inherently predictive of the quality of an individual in the social sphere. By virtue of IQ tests correlated with self-reported race, neo-fascists argue that race and IQ are genetically linked, and that races with lower average IQs ought to be culled for the sake of society.

The difficulty here comes not only with the spurious race-gene lie, but also a complex lie about IQ. First, for the fascist lie to work, all forms of human intellectual acumen can be reduced to a single metric, IQ. There are no math people. There are no lit people. There are no science

people. There are no people's people. There are only IQ people.

Second, this fascist lie falls apart when it comes to whether IQ has social meaning. As just implied, there are a variety of different intelligences that individuals have varying capacities for. So too are there a variety of outcomes for "social desirability." The eugenicist IQ theory posits that these socially desirable outcomes can also be ranked linearly so as to be compared against IQ in order to claim a link between the two. The firefighter, the artist, the teacher, the CEO, can all be placed into a neat hierarchy to reduce people to simply "better" or "worse."

Third, this fascist lie requires IQ to be genetically heritable. One of eugenicists favorite sources to justify this lie is the Minnesota Twin Family Study, a study financially backed by the Pioneer Fund conducted by eugenicist Thomas Bouchard in 1979. Bouchard purported to show that identical twins separated at birth through the adoption system ended up to have, on average, similar IQ scores. Critics however have pointed out significant shortcomings with Bouchard's findings. These criticisms are summarized neatly by psychologist Jay Joseph:

These problems include (a) the doubtful "separation" of twins, who frequently grew up together and had contact over much of their lives, (b) similarity bias in the methods of MZA identification and recruitment, (c) the questionable status of "intelligence" and "personality" as valid and quantifiable constructs, (d) the failure of the MISTRA researchers to publish or share raw data and life history information for the twins under study, and (e) the impact that the researchers' bias in favor of genetic interpretations may have had on their results and conclusions.⁴¹

This leads to the fourth pillar this fascist lie rests upon which is that IQ is unchangeable. This is commonly confused with heritability, but glasses make you see better and ladders make you taller. With IQ as well, it appears that it can be boosted. Over the course of their use, IQ tests have gotten increasingly difficult, despite the average score being fixed at 100. This gradual increase was dubbed the Flynn effect after James R. Flynn who worked to popularize knowledge of its existence.⁴² Further, it also appears that IQ test results can be increased by practicing memory exercises.⁴³

All of these lies are tied together with an explanation that intelligence and race are determined not only genetically, but by the same gene. Despite the proliferation of twin studies, IQ tests, and racial categorization schemes, eugenicists have been unable to identify, or even

41 Joseph, "The Genetics of Political Attitudes and Behavior," 209.

42 See, for example, Flynn, "Massive IQ Gains in 14 Nations."

43 Au, et al., "Improving Fluid Intelligence with Training on Working Memory."

attempt to identify, such a gene or even a cluster of genes.

Survival of the Fittest

An exceedingly common mistaken belief that feeds fascist ideology is the competitive model of “survival of the fittest.” Although often attributed to Charles Darwin and his theory of evolution, the phrase actually originated with Herbert Spencer who might be today be considered an amateur sociobiologist, having never held a research position in what he preached. Spencer did, however, get inspired for his theory of survival of the fittest from Darwin’s *Origin of the Species*.

It is common to think that evolution, natural selection, and survival of the fittest describe the same phenomenon, but they do not. Evolution merely describes the fact *that* species’ traits change over time. Natural selection posits that those changes are progressive with respect to surviving an environment. And survival of the fittest attempts to describe the same phenomenon not with respect to traits, but with respect to individuals.

Herbert Spencer’s classical liberal approach is quite akin to that of neo-fascists. Like Darwin, Spencer believed that natural selection, and consequently his own “survival of the fittest,” happened at the level of “race” which would today be understood as encompassing not only race as we understand it today, but all varieties of traits in any being, plant or animal. Spencer was very partial to applying his reasoning to the plight of the poor. And like Darwin, Spencer believed that it was competition that drove natural selection and, hence, evolution.

For neo-fascists, this means that races, as we understand them today, are locked in a perpetual battle against each other. In this battle, according to the neo-fascists, different races are equipped with different abilities and behavioral traits. The distribution of these traits, the neo-fascists argue, gives rise to the structure of the world as they see it—an army of dull witted but physically strong people of color and their race-traitor white allies ruled by the intelligent but deceptive Jews to eradicate white people and destroy all cultures.

A refutation of anti-semitic conspiracy theory would be too long to produce here and has already been done extensively by organizations such as the Jewish Virtual Library. What I instead intend to contest is the belief that competition drives evolution. Although from the vantage point of capitalist society, it would seem that competition drives daily life, a look into the history of human society and of the animal kingdom demonstrates that this story is questionable at best.

Peter Kropotkin was among the first to articulate this view of evolution in his book, originally published between 1890 and 1896 as a series of essays, *Mutual Aid: A Factor in Evolution*. In it, he draws examples from the behaviors of creatures throughout the animal kingdom demonstrating the ways that mutual support and mutual defense of all members of the species ensures the species's survival. He extends this to humanity to show that the foundation of human society is cooperation. He shows not only how early humans lived in non-competitive bands and tribes, but also other stages of human development showing how farming communities, guilds, and unions all exemplify the cooperation necessary for the survival of the species.

Taken to its logical conclusion, a war of each against all, as described by Spencer, would wipe out a species. Further, allowing certain traits to disappear simply because they aren't advantageous in the present environment would lead to vulnerability to environmental changes as in the case with the peppered moth.

Fascism Is Destined for Failure

If entertaining fascist lies shatters objectivity with a cloak of naïve neutrality, so too does entertaining their revision of fascist history. Fascist regimes in practice depended upon a nationalist enthusiasm, an untenable technocracy, and a slippery traditionalism. All of these are, by their design, destined for failure and did fail in practice.

As previously stated, public enthusiasm for classical fascism waned over the lifetimes of its regimes. This is because enthusiasm for fascism meant an identification with the nation above the self and an ardor for eliminationism. It is far easier to identify with a nation when the state representing that nation isn't telling you that the nation needs you to go without. Enthusiasm for fascism's politics of eliminating foreign and domestic enemies is more palatable when it isn't your family, friends, and neighbors being taken away by the state.

Certainly fascism did not run on enthusiasm alone. No society could. Fascism attempted to modify the capitalist system of production with an economic arrangement known as technocracy. Technocracy describes a political system in which experts in various fields are given control over relevant industries.

The problem with this arrangement is that these experts must ultimately be installed somehow, and that somehow is a political decision. However, such experts have personal interests, and business interests have no problem finding out what those are. The consequence of technocracy is cartelization of industry and effective monopoly, which

with markets allows business to extract more profits at the expense of workers and consumers alike.

Fascism demonstrates how easily discarded stupidity can be recast as forbidden knowledge. Fascism excels at this by combining its vision for a scientifically futuristic society with a mythology of tradition. If you ask a fascist to explain what they mean by “tradition” you will likely not get an answer so much as objections to the question. For most people, tradition is a collection of current practices and customs handed down, but not necessarily rationally applied.

For fascists, tradition may as well be short for “trash edition.” For the most part, the role tradition plays in fascist ideology is in denial of current scientific and social consensus. Fascists demonstrate how easily discarded stupidity can be recast as forbidden knowledge. Fascists excuse as “tradition” the resurrection of outmoded forms of thinking purely for the sake of monopolizing public conversation.

Fascists purport that this tradition must be sustained to maintain the integrity of their culture. But culture has never flourished through strict preservation. Culture, rather, develops through change. For example, in the Jewish culture we celebrate our mythical liberation from the slavery of Mitzraim by consuming a variety of food items meant to symbolize a portion of the imagined Jewish journey. These foods are displayed at the center of the table on what’s known as a Seder plate. Recently, new interpretations of the story of the Jewish exodus have prompted the addition of new foods to the Seder plate, enhancing the tradition by imbuing it with more meaning. Tradition wasn’t handed down all at once, and fascists are ridiculous for presenting it like it was.

Fascism Is Internally Contradictory

Commentators have noted how fascism’s policy pronouncements are quite contradictory and seemingly capricious. As we’ve discovered, some scholars use this to claim that fascists have no ideology beyond brutality. Others, however, identify fascism’s ideology not as a cluster of policy positions, but as a value system predicated on rather unique principles.

Many scholars have claimed that fascism does have an ideology predicated on core values of things like the will to power, the nation, the leadership principle, hierarchical inequality, producerism, and capital ownership. With this, many scholars, most notably Zeev Sternhell, claim that fascists do, in fact, have a coherent ideology. However, little time has been spent on exploring whether this ideology is comprised of compatible principles.

Unsurprisingly, fascism's principles are internally contradictory. The will to power, universally applied, would make for an exceedingly unstable nation. The leadership principle contravenes the fascist dual conception of inequality. And producerism cannot be sustained in a system based on the ownership of the means of production.

Will to Power vs. The Nation

For the fascist, every creature—people, animals, plants, nations—are imbued with a destiny. That creature can choose to reach their destiny or not, the fascist says, and their likelihood of doing so is determined by their will to power. This is in contrast to what they label the “causality thinking” of conventional science.

The will to power is ultimately the will to dominate and control one's surroundings to one's advantage. This include people. For the fascist, the will to power is how nations are formed. This can only be true with the egoistic perspective the fascist takes in developing this argument. People dominating other people creates groups that constitute families, communities, and ultimately, the nation.

However, taken from a society perspective, it's easy to see how this system breaks down. If the fascist does achieve a society in which individuals are motivated to reach their destiny through their will to power, you would create a nation of chaos. A nation founded on the will to power would be the most back-biting, intransigent, and unstable nation imaginable. It would eat itself. If a nation is to be stable, it can't be founded on the will to power; or if society is founded on the will to power, it can't create healthy nations.

The Leadership Principle vs. Inequality

The fascist believes that all things are created inherently unequal. However, when they say equality, they mean it in two senses which they slide between to make their ideology seem palatable. In one sense, inequality is horizontal: things are just different and even things that seem equal occupy different space at different times and therefore have different experiences that shape them in different ways. In the second sense, inequality is vertical: the fact of inequality means that things can be ordered according to how they are unequal.

The leadership principle is the attempt to distill the essence of this latter form of inequality. Again, the fascist takes an egoistic perspective, and can't see the broader picture. For the fascist, the second sense of inequality means that the better should lead the worse. This is where they draw their ideal of technocracy from.

However, in the broader picture the first sense of inequality annihilates the leadership principle based on the second. Sure we are all different, but we are different in different ways. Our difference can not be reduced to a single metric of better or worse. Therefore, it is impossible to have a society with any sort of executive rule since it is likely impossible for someone to be expert in everything in order to make decisions about them. Further, it is also impossible to be the supreme expert in a given field given all the subfields one can devote their time towards. Hence, due to the complexity of inequality, the leadership principle breaks down, and if genuinely applied, the leadership principle would break what fascists see as our natural inequality.

Producerism vs. Capital Ownership

One of the values fascists hold very dear is the idea of producerism: an economy in which people earn for producing goods not producing finance. This often ties into anti-semitic tropes about international Jewish bankers and national sovereignty. Producerism involves the production of goods by businesses alone without financiers and investors making money by having money.

Thus producerism keeps intact markets, property ownership, and most importantly, ownership of capital—machinery, factories, vehicles, etc. That is, it preserves the social relations in the economic system which made capitalism unique with respect to its predecessors: wage labor and capital ownership. Because of this maintenance of the proletariat and bourgeois classes, fascism is susceptible to economic crises in the same way that capitalism is.

Like in capitalism, production in fascist economies is driven by the profit motive. Thus, capital owners will attempt to increase their profit margins as much as they can. This is not necessarily by choice. Since profits are often the funds with which capital owners invest in more capital, capital owners are bound to increase their profits to maintain the growth necessary to compete with their rivals. Since profit is value of goods sold minus costs, they will either try to maximize the value of the good they sell or minimize their costs.

Since owners of capital are largely unable to control the cost of capital inputs, they have two means of reducing their costs: charging more for their goods or paying workers less. While capitalists might not be able to raise their prices to compete, suppressing wages is as simple as keeping them the same. Because inflation is almost always happening, the real purchasing power of workers will decrease as the share of earnings made as profit goes up.

Since wage earners constitute the bulk of consumers in the market, this suppression of wages has consequences for the economy. As the purchasing power of wages decreases, consumers are less able to afford the goods and services they need and want. As the consumer base dries up, capital owners will see a drop in sales, and usually begin to lay off workers to save on costs. This further depresses consumer purchasing power, leading to more reduced spending and additional layoffs.

Without finance, this crisis would happen almost immediately. Finance allows consumers to borrow to buy the goods and services they use, keeping the system afloat. However, even this is only a temporary fix.

Initially, borrowers will only borrow what they can afford, ensuring that they can pay back both the principal on the loan—the original amount the loan was for—and the interest charges—the additional amount paid for the convenience of having money now rather than later. These loans are written into bank balances as assets and will appear as positive revenue for banks, generating investment. As borrowers grow more confident in the economy, they begin to take out loans that they can't necessarily afford, but can still pay off the interest on, keeping the loans out of default.

Eventually, borrowers begin taking on loans that they can't pay off the principal or interest on, instead borrowing to pay off existing loans. Since banks will only let you take on so much debt before denying you a loan, eventually borrowers begin to default en masse, causing finance to dry up as the loans that the bank had put into their books as assets are now worthless.

Just like in a system without finance, the system collapses under the weight of its primary driver—the profit motive. Thus producerism is impossible with capital ownership, but it's also impossible without it.

The Big Picture

It is your duty to get fascism right. Whether you are a journalist, a researcher, an activist, or just a lay member of your community, knowing what fascism is and anticipating its approach is paramount to stopping it from gaining influence in our society.

Being able to identify fascism allows you to intervene into loved ones' experimentations with far right ideologies before they end up deep in the rabbit hole.⁴⁴ Being able to identify fascism allows you to accu-

44 I discuss ways to do this in my first zine, *You Can't Punch Every Nazi*.

rately report on fascists and thwart their attempts to sanitize their true beliefs and intentions. Being able to identify fascism allows you to identify neo-fascists and keep an eye on them. Being able to identify fascism can help you prevent it from infecting your local school board, city council, state and federal legislature, and the presidency.

There is no downside to being attuned to fascism as it has historically existed and as it exists today. This zine is only the first step in that direction.

References

- Adorno, Theodor, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel Levinson, and Nevitt Sanford. *The Authoritarian Personality*. New York, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950.
- Allardyce, Gilbert. "What Fascism Is Not: Thoughts on the Deflation of a Concept." *American Historical Review*. 84 (1979): 367-388.
- Arendt, Hannah. *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. New York, New York: Schocken Books, 1950.
- Au, Jacky, Ellen Sheehan, Nancy Tsai, Greg J. Duncan, Martin Buschkuehl, and Susanne M. Jaeggi. "Improving Fluid Intelligence with Training on Working Memory: A Meta-Analysis." *Psychonomic Bulletin & Review*. 22 no 2 (2015): 366-377.
- Barnshad, Michael, Stephen Wooding, Benjamin A. Salisbury, and J. Clairborne Stephens. "Deconstructing the Relationship Between Genetics and Race." *Nature Reviews*. 5 (2004): 598-608.
- Bar-On, Tamir. *Where Have All the Fascists Gone?* Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate, 2007.
- Belkhir, Jean. "Intelligence and Race, Gender, Class: The Fallacy of Genetic Determinism." *Race, Gender & Class*. 5 no. 3 (1998): 136-176.
- Ben-Ghiat, Ruth. *Italian Fascism's Empire Cinema*. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2015.
- Ben-Ghiat, Ruth. *Fascist Modernities: Italy 1922-1945*. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2001.
- Bray, Mark. *Antifa: The Antifascist Handbook*. Brooklyn, New York: Melville House Publishing, 2017.
- Carsten, F.L. *The Rise of Fascism*. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1967.
- Cassels, Alan. *Fascism*. New York, New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, Co., 1975.
- Collins, Francis. "What We Do and Don't Know About 'Race', 'Ethnicity', Genetics, and Health at the Dawn of the Genome Era." *Nature Genetics Supplement*. 36 no. 11 (2004): 513-515.
- Coogan, Kevin. *Dreamer of the Day: Francis Parker Yockey and the Post-War Fascist International*. Brooklyn, New York: Autonomedia, 1999.

- Costa Pinto, António and Aristotle Kallis, eds. *Rethinking Fascism and Dictatorship in Europe*. New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014.
- De Felice, Renzo. *Interpretations of Fascism*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1977.
- Del Boca, Angelo and Mario Giovana. *Fascism Today: A World Survey*. Translated by R.H. Boothroyd. New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1969.
- Dimitrov, Georgi. "The Fascist Offensive and the Tasks of the Communist International." in *VII Congress of the Communist International: Abridged Stenographic Report of Proceedings*. Moscow, Russia: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1935.
- Eatwell, Roger. *Fascism: A History*. New York, New York: Penguin Books, 1995.
- Finchelstein, Federico. *From Fascism to Populism in History*. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2017.
- Finchelstein, Federico. *The Ideological Origins of the Dirty War*. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2014.
- Finchelstein, Federico. *Transatlantic Fascism: Ideology, Violence, and the Sacred in Argentina and Italy, 1919-1945*. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2010.
- Flynn, James R. "Massive IQ Gains in 14 Nations: What IQ Tests Really Measure." *Psychological Bulletin*. 101 no. 2 (1987): 171-191.
- Fromm, Erich. *The Fear of Freedom*. London, United Kingdom: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960.
- Gentile, Emilio. *The Sacralization of Politics in Fascist Italy*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1993.
- Gould, Stephen J. *The Mismeasure of Man*. New York, New York: W.W. Norton, 1996.
- Gramsci, Antonio. "Democracy and Fascism." in *Antonio Gramsci: Selections from Political Writings (1921-1926)*. edited/translated by Quentin Hoare. London, United Kingdom: Lawrence and Wishart, 1978.
- Griffin, Roger. *The Nature of Fascism*. London, United Kingdom: Psychology Press, 1991.
- Hayes, Paul M. *Fascism*. Crows Nest, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1973.

- Haynes, Rebecca Ann and Martyn Rady. *In the Shadow of Hitler: Personalities of the Right in Central and Eastern Europe*. New York, NY: I.B. Tauris, 2015.
- Haynes, Rebecca Ann. "Review of Robert O. Paxton, *The Anatomy of Fascism*." *Slavonic and East European Review*. 84 no. 4 (2006): 770-772.
- Horkheimer, Max. *Eclipse of Reason*. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 1947.
- Horkheimer, Max and Theodor Adorno. *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. John Cumming, trans. New York, New York: Continuum, 1997.
- Isaacson, Michael. "10 Antifascist Activities That Don't Involve Your Fists." *Jewish Currents*. October 9, 2017. (Accessed 9/30/2019) <https://jewishcurrents.org/10-antifascist-activities-that-dont-involve-your-fists/>
- Isaacson, Michael. *You Can't Punch Every Nazi*. Jersey City, NJ: Vulgar Economics, 2017.
- Joseph, Jay. "The Genetics of Political Attitudes and Behavior: Claims and Refutations." *Ethical Human Psychology and Psychiatry*. 12 no. 3 (2010): 200-217.
- Kallis, Aristotle. *The Fascism Reader*. New York, New York: Routledge, 2003.
- Kershaw, Ian. *The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation*. London, United Kingdom: Arnold Press, 1989.
- Kevles, Daniel. *In the Name of Eugenics*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1985.
- Kitchen, Martin. *Fascism*. London, United Kingdom: Macmillan, 1976.
- Kropotkin, Peter. *Mutual Aid: A Factor in Evolution*. Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, 2006.
- Lacqueur, Walter. *Fascism: A Reader's Guide: Analyses, Interpretations, Bibliography*. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1976.
- Largent, Mark. *Breeding Contempt: The History of Coerced Sterilization in the United States*. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2008.

- Larsen, Stein Ugelvik, Bernt Hagtvet, and Jan Petter Myklebust. *Who Were the Fascists?: Social Roots of European Fascism*. Oslo, Norway: Universitetsforlaget, 1980.
- Lee, Martin A. *The Beast Reawakens: Fascism's Resurgence from Hitler's Spymasters to Today's Neo-Nazi Groups and Right-Wing Extremists*. London, United Kingdom: Routledge, 2013.
- Mattei, Clara. "Austerity and Repressive Politics: Italian Economists in the Early Years of the Fascist Government: 1922-1925." *European Journal of the History of Economic Thought*. 24 no. 5 (2017): 988-1026.
- McClelland, J.S. *The French Right (from de Maistre to Maurras)*. London, United Kingdom: John Cape Publications, 1970.
- Mosse, George. *Toward the Final Solution*. London, United Kingdom: Dent, 1978.
- Mosse, George. *The Crisis of the German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich*. New York, New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964.
- Nagy-Talavera, Nicholas M. *The Green Shirts and the Others: A History of Fascism in Hungary and Rumania*. Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1970.
- Neocleous, Mark. *Fascism*. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1997.
- Nolte, Ernst. *Three Faces of Fascism*. New York, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966.
- Passmore, Kevin. *Fascism: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Paxton, Robert. *The Anatomy of Fascism*. New York, New York: Vintage Books, 2004.
- Payne, Stanley. *Fascism: Comparison and Definition*. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980.
- Polanyi, Karl. *The Great Transformation*. Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press, 2001.
- Poulantzas, Nicos. *Fascism and Dictatorship: The Third International and the Problem of Fascism*. London, United Kingdom: Verso Books, 1979.

- Reich, Wilhelm. *The Mass Psychology of Fascism*. Mary Boyd Higgins, trans. New York, New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 1970.
- Reich, Wilhelm. *What Is Class Consciousness?* London, United Kingdom: Socialist Reproduction, 1971.
- Renton, David. *Fascism: Theory and Practice*. London, United Kingdom: Pluto Press, 1999.
- Roberts, David D. *The Syndicalist Tradition and Italian Fascism*. Manchester, United Kingdom: Manchester University Press, 1979.
- Ross, Alexander Reid. *Against the Fascist Creep*. Oakland, California: AK Press, 2017.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul. *Anti-Semite and Jew*. New York, New York: Schocken Books, 1948.
- Smedley, Audrey. "'Race' and the Construction of Human Identity." *American Anthropologist*. 100 no. 3 (1998): 690-702.
- Sternhell, Zeev, Mario Sznajder, and Maia Asheri. *The Birth of Fascist Ideology*. David Maisel, trans. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994.
- Sternhell, Zeev. *Neither Left nor Right: Fascist Ideology in France*. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1986.
- Sternhell, Zeev. "Fascist Ideology." in *Fascism: A Reader's Guide*. edited by Walter Laqueur. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1976.
- Sunshine, Spencer. *40 Ways to Fight Nazis*. August 10, 2018. (Accessed 9/30/2019) <http://www.spencersunshine.com/2018/8/10/40-ways-to-fight-nazis/>
- Theweleit, Klaus. *Male Fantasies*. 2 vols. Translated by Stephen Conway, Erica Carter, and Chris Turner. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1987 & 1989.
- Trotsky, Leon. "Whither France?" in *Fascism: What It Is and How to Fight It*. edited by Pioneer Publishers. New York, New York: Pioneer Publishers, 1969.

Weber, Eugen. *Varieties of Fascism: Doctrines of Revolution in the Twentieth Century*. New York, New York: Van Nostrand, 1964. Wolin, Richard. *The Seduction of Unreason: The Intellectual Romance with Fascism from Nietzsche to Postmodernism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004.

Woodley, Daniel. *Fascism and Political Theory: Critical Perspectives on Fascist Ideology*. New York, New York: Routledge, 2009.

Zeskind, Leonard. *Blood and Politics: The White Nationalist Movement from the Margins to the Mainstream*. New York, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009.

Zetkin, Clara. "Fascism." *Labor Monthly*. August (1923): 69-78.

This is a zine from

Vulgar Economics



This zine may be distributed for free in its entirety or in excerpts with attribution. Please contact the author concerning printing, distributing, or selling this zine. I can provide spreads upon request. Please email me for paywalled sources you are unable to find on your own. Venmo or PayPal me \$5-10 with your address to receive a printed copy of this zine.

Website: vulgareconomics.com
Email: mike@vulgareconomics.com
Twitter: [@VulgarEconomics](https://twitter.com/VulgarEconomics)
Facebook: [/ve.economics](https://www.facebook.com/ve.economics)
Venmo: [@VulgarEconomics](https://venmo.com/VulgarEconomics)
PayPal: paypal.me/VulgarEconomics
PDF: tinyurl.com/ButAreYouOne